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Investment is the bedrock of the economic relationship between the European Union and 
the United States. Together, EU and US firms have invested more than US$ 4 trillion in 
each others’ markets, and bilateral investment dwarfs transatlantic trade in goods and 
services.1 As the EU and US begin negotiating a Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) -- an agreement that could be unprecedented in both its scale and 
scope -- investment is shaping up to be one of the more difficult areas of discussion, both 
substantively and politically. The EU’s process for developing an overall TTIP 
negotiating mandate revealed deep fissures among EU institutions and stakeholders on 
investment, with Germany and other member states, certain non-governmental and public 
interest organizations and the European Parliament concerned about the commercial and 
legal implications of investment agreements with large economies. 
 
Notwithstanding the public debate over investment in both Europe and the United States, 
it is critical that negotiators take advantage of the opportunity that the TTIP presents for 
the world’s two largest economies indirectly to craft state-of-the-art global standards for 
cross-border investment, for example in the following areas. 
 
Forced localization measures. Some of the most pernicious barriers to international 
investment are “forced localization measures.” These require that firms locate operations, 
consume goods or services or conduct other activities within a country’s territory. Such 
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measures include requirements that firms achieve certain levels of “local content” in their 
products, ensure that a certain percentage of senior management are nationals and 
transfer proprietary technology to the government or local competitors (or both), among 
other measures. The US has taken an aggressive approach to such “performance 
requirements” since issuing its 2004 model bilateral investment treaty (BIT), adding to 
that a discipline on “indigenous innovation requirements” (i.e., requirements that 
economic actors use domestically developed technology in their production processes) in 
its 2012 revision. While the EU is only beginning to negotiate investment provisions 
since the Lisbon Treaty gave it competence over investment in 2009, evidence from intra-
EU deliberations suggests that it will support a similarly tough approach to forced 
localization measures. If the two sides agree to strong prohibitions on such measures, 
they will help create pressure on the many third countries that rely on such requirements 
to reconsider or revise their practices. 
 
Government influence and control. Few developments in the global economy over the 
past decade have been as significant as the growing participation of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), sovereign wealth funds and other government-controlled entities. As 
the involvement of such firms in international commerce has increased, so too have 
concerns over the financial, regulatory and other advantages that governments provide 
them (and that such firms, by extension, may also provide to favored entities). The EU 
has well-developed approaches to manage the competitive distortions that may arise 
where government entities participate in the economy, which one would expect to affect 
its approach to international agreements. The US recently tightened its coverage of SOEs 
in its investment chapters and added to its competition chapters disciplines on SOEs 
acting in a commercial capacity. Combining the EU and US approaches, the TTIP could 
help ensure that SOEs -- whether acting as government regulators or economic 
competitors -- do not upset the playing field in their own favor. 
 
Investor-state dispute settlement. Many governments (in places like Latin America, 
Australia and India) are retreating -- subtly but perceptibly -- from the idea of allowing 
foreign investors to enforce their investment treaty rights through binding international 
arbitration. Fearing not so much investor-state claims but the possibility of investor-state 
claims, some countries are stepping back from the remedy and embracing a vague and 
malleable notion of “policy space.” The TTIP negotiations offer the possibility of an 
approach to dispute settlement that maintains a robust investor-state remedy while 
responding to the legitimate concerns of governments. Both the US model BIT text and 
EU policy positions envision an investor-state mechanism that includes procedural 
safeguards to prevent frivolous claims, enhance transparency and public participation in 
the arbitration process and ensure the ultimate ability of governments to set their public 
policy priorities. By agreeing on a dispute-settlement mechanism that provides both 
effective recourse for aggrieved investors and appropriate protections to defending 
governments, the EU and US could set an example of balance and pragmatism for other 
governments struggling to justify the remedy to skeptical stakeholders. 
 
Many of the gains of the TTIP will rebound to the benefit of companies operating across 
the Atlantic, for example where the two sides lower tariffs, simplify customs procedures 
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or eliminate needless regulatory differences. Other gains, however, will help firms 
operating in third countries, for example where the EU and US have the ability to shape 
globally relevant norms and principles regarding the treatment of cross-border 
investment. The TTIP investment negotiations provide the two sides an opportunity to do 
just that and, in so doing, to begin to define global investment policy for the next 
generation. 
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